‘The
Tower’, they call the shortest of these buildings. Do they not get the
feeling its name has been somewhat overtaken?
Upstream
of Tower Bridge, the tidal Thames ebbs and flows through the current power
centres of both the English nation and the larger constitutional vehicle it
presently rides, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
(a.k.a. ‘the Union’) – although that ride feels wobblier by the day.
Many
people think of this country as a democracy, and one of the oldest in the
world at that. Its civilised, courteous, tea-sipping national persona fuses in their
minds with the landscape of its capital city’s riverside, where red buses link
the likes of the Palace of Westminster, the Victoria Embankment and St. Paul’s
Cathedral. It is in pride of place at the downstream culmination of this
catalogue of modern wonders that stands the Tower of London, which draws in some
three million awestruck visitors per year.
But
there is a problem here.
The Tower was a political prison, torture dungeon and
killing field. Erected
by William of Normandy as part of a network of castles to scare his conquered
populace into submission, by the time the English nation consolidated under the
Tudor dynasty (1509-1603) the main use of this fortress had shifted to
confining, torturing, and oftentimes decapitating high-profile
political dissidents and prisoners of war. Thomas More, Anne Boleyn, Lady
Jane Grey and William Laud were among the dozens who had their heads handed to
them here, and even four hundred years later it was dragging German spies in
front of its firing squads in both World Wars. Yet nowadays you can pay a hefty
£24.70 per head – and keep the head – to go in and take carefree selfies on top
of those corpses while marvelling at this architectural symbol
of a country which, they would have you believe, has political freedom and
human rights in its national DNA.
That
story of democratic destiny has been incredibly powerful in the English
self-consciousness. But as we follow the Thames
right through the middle of its ancient nuclei – the City of London and
the City of Westminster – the river will have a quite different story to
show us: of a heritage packed, like everyone else’s, with greed, oppression,
and violent struggle. A story in which for every piece of democracy these
people have scrapped together, they have had to fight and die for it and could
never be sure they wouldn’t lose it again at any moment – and in which its
worst enemies have not been external threats, but the impulse for the abuse of
power that has ever lurked in their own culture.
Power.
Yes. That will be the Dark River’s melody today.
Start:
Tower Bridge (nearest station: Tower Hill)
End:
Putney Bridge (nearest stations: Putney Bridge, Vauxhall)
Length: 16km (10 miles)
Location:
Greater London – Borough of Southwark, Borough of Lambeth, Borough of
Wandsworth
Topics:
Power versus democracy amongst the City of London merchants, Southwark bishops,
Bankside and Lambeth recreationalists and the English Parliament in Westminster,
then escaping through Vauxhall, Battersea, Wandsworth and Putney.
Today’s exploration is long. If you want to keep to the three main discussions,
they are the City of London (immediately below), the story of Parliament
(skip to ‘City of Westminster’), and the Putney Debates (skip to
‘Putney’ at the end.)
The City of London
Here’s
someone who knows a thing or two about power. Trajan, once a mighty Roman
emperor (r.98-117 CE), now subsists on a zero-hours contract as a human
signpost outside Tower Hill station. Look at this wall, he tells everyone. My
power reached all the way up here once.
This
is one of the last remaining traces of the original wall the Romans built
around Londinium, which stood where the City of London stands
now. ‘The City’ is not that large, and they even nickname it the ‘square
mile’. That is the limit of what London meant until the most recent
centuries, when its industrial population explosion and suburbanisation widened
it to what is now called Greater London.
The
essential point: the City of London is distinct from Greater London.
Which makes a start to explaining why the Mayor of London, whose office
faces the City across the river, is not in fact the mayor of it.
The Greater London Authority (GLA) headquarters, which houses the Mayor’s office. The point of the ‘Greater’ is that the GLA governs ‘Greater London’ and not the City of London. |
The
office of the Mayor, currently held by Sadiq Khan, is a
new one, created only in 2000. The Mayor is chosen every four years by popular
election and heads the Greater London Authority (GLA). This is itself
the latest in a short sequence of bodies that have governed Greater London
since its formation in the 1960s, which shows just how recent the concept is.
But
the Old City is too ancient, powerful, and convinced of its own exclusive
destiny to condescend to such trifles as democratic elections. It has its own
leader – confusingly, the Lord Mayor of London – who is elected
not by the people but by the City’s livery companies and whose office
has existed since 1189. The livery companies are the City’s merchant guilds or
trading associations, typically styled ‘The Worshipful Company of’ something or
other and in some cases hundreds of years old. And in the costumes, rituals,
closed double doors and archaic vocabulary of the ‘sheriffs’ and ‘aldermen’ of
their City of London Corporation – their very own island of
self-government and buttress against hostile waves of democracy from the
little people outside – they are not afraid to show it.
Their
own clutch of skyscrapers is new, an outcome of the unshackling of the
financial sector in the 1980s which has replaced England’s real economy.
Nonetheless it was not out of character for some in the City to embrace that
new opportunity. The
language of their governance structures speaks for itself: the Old City has
always been the domain of merchants and traders willing to do whatever it takes
to turn a profit, and it is this that has secured its constant dominance since
its revival under King Alfred in the ninth century.
Through
the river, the merchants connected England to the outside world. They brought
other people’s stuff in and got rich selling it. That made them powerful. It
made whoever could control or count on their support powerful too. So whether
it was Anglo-Saxons, Vikings, Normans, Tudors, or later political heavyweights
with either imperialist or democratic visions, the City was too precious and
useful an asset for them to ignore, let alone confront. Whatever rulers or ideas
held sway over England in a given time, the City was happy to exploit to serve
its own interests, yet just as swift to brandish its clout if it felt they threatened
them.
The story of the docklands was a perfect example. In earlier centuries the City
merchants wrestled ferociously with successive royal governments to produce the
Legal Quays system. These quays – all of course along the City’s own
riverbank – were the only places cargo ships were allowed to unload, so of
course all their delicious import taxes got funnelled straight into the hands
of the Corporation’s customs officials. Naturally they swarmed with corruption
and bitterly resisted the rise of the docks until the clogging of the
river with ships left no real choice. Enraged by the dock monopolies’ destruction
of business at their Legal Quays, they nonetheless waited patiently for those
monopolies to expire then scrambled for everything that fell through the big
dock companies’ arms, in some cases creating new docks of their own. And when
the whole dock system came crashing down in the late twentieth century to be
swept up by the free-market revolution, those who now sit atop these
new Towers of London, the Gherkins and Walkie-Talkies, were ready to bite their
own chunks off it too by leaping into the new ranks of financiers and property
speculators atop England’s undead
modernity.
Now
whether one defines democracy narrowly as the ballot box or broadly as a system where people have political power over their own lives, there is a mounting sense that
the English and British democratic project is in serious trouble. What, in this
crisis, is the significance of the City of London’s power?
Perhaps
its vote in the 2016 Cameron referendum – 75.3% to Remain, 24.7% to Leave –
reflects its ambiguity. Most merchants dislike uncertainty and enjoy having
access to other people’s markets, and there is no doubt that these Brexiting
times have left a great many of them anxious and frustrated. Yet as in the
docklands, others among their number salivate at the prospect of upheaval: the disaster capitalist
bankers, speculators, free-market ideologues and merchants of death who see in
every calamity the chance to make huge gains out of others’ shock and misery
and, it is feared, await
the chance to do just that if Brexit goes through. Their values and
outcomes – deregulation, tax avoidance, rock-bottom health and environmental
standards, exploitative and insecure work, and so on – are very
straightforwardly anti-democratic: the whole point is to carve power over people’s
lives away from them by corroding their health and rights. And that is to say
nothing of the City’s behaviour in bringing about the Brexit crisis in the
first place, whether by causing the 2007-8 financial crisis, or by rescuing itself
with public money then continuing to siphon the nation’s wealth as austerity
policies ripped the majority population into poverty.
In
pain and rage, and often with little left to lose, that population rails
against the City merchants. It accuses them, not without basis, of wrecking
English democracy in any meaningful sense, but what that sense is differs
depending on the values and identities of the accusers. In the hands of the
nationalists, it becomes a charge that the merchants are rootless elites with
no higher loyalty to their nation. From this there rises a tin-pot notion of
democracy as the brute power of a (real or perceived) majority, identifying
along tribal or ethnic lines and enforceable through violent masculinism, whence
former Prime Minister Theresa May’s infamous ‘citizens
of nowhere’ speech.
It is this populist debasement of democracy, with its
shades of the path to twentieth-century fascism, that has found expression
through the Brexit movement, imperilling the English democratic experiment in a
paradoxical double assault with the disaster capitalists in hatred of whom it
emerged but in whose prophecies of rapturous upheaval it identifies a common
destiny.
Which
casts a certain irony upon the HMS Belfast moored across the
river.
This
navy cruiser, launched in 1938, went on many adventures in World War II before settling
here as an iconic museum ship. It embodies what is without question the most
prominent tale in the popular storybook of English democracy: its triumphant
fight in 1939-45 against the external threat from Nazi racist authoritarianism.
That the Nazis were a threat – an unspeakably heinous one – is in no doubt; but
they were never the only threat, nor even the most dangerous. The storytellers’
mistake has been to locate the threat too heavily in the external part,
and not enough in the racist authoritarianism part which has just as
long been present in English hearts too. The worst enemies of English democracy
have always been in England – and here, right beside this old warrior, are
targets it might want to scrutinise for creating the poverty and alienation that
nurtures those.
Southwark
The
City of London sits entirely on the north bank, which has generated a lasting
dynamic on the lower Thames: the dominance of north over south.
Yet London’s
site was chosen because it was the lowest point on the river the Romans could
ford it. And till 1750 London Bridge was the only place you could
ford it because our friends the City merchants had a vested interest in
resolutely opposing new bridges, lest they cause any of the revenues of its tolls,
ferries and bridge-side businesses to fall away from their single open maw.
And
so a secondary settlement grew up round the south end of the bridge. Southwark
– the ‘south work’ – is thus one of the oldest pieces of the Greater
London conurbation. Indeed, the very fact it came into existence as the ‘other’
London, consisting of several liberties outside the City’s jurisdiction, makes it
an inviting place to look for alternative expressions of power.
Like
this, for instance.
Southwark Crown Court. It has fifteen courtrooms and seems especially interested in serious fraud cases. |
Southwark
Crown Court is one of several Crown Courts in London, which occupy a rung about
halfway up the English judicial system. Justice systems represent a significant
plank of power in their own right in the stories of most nations, and those that
aspire to democracy generally find it important that they be fair, transparent,
and uninfluenced by other centres of power, particularly the political
establishment: all people, no matter how powerful, should be equal before it. But
in practice this perfect rule of law is never absolutely achieved. Laws
and their arbitration grow from and are influenced by political forces and cultural
values, especially oppressive and anti-democratic ones like race, gender and
class. The result has been a tension between brave ideals and shameful realities, and
a perpetual struggle between them for control of the justice system’s power.
How
far that system in England has promoted or frustrated democratic outcomes is too
vast a subject to delve deep into here. At the least, it is mercurial. It has
often been ruthlessly oppressive: as a random sample of the courts’ political
abuses, consider their role in Enclosure and the ‘Bloody
Code’; the Bloody
Assizes show trials of the 1680s (yes, that’s a lot of blood); and as a
vehicle of homophobic prejudice in persecuting Oscar Wilde and Alan Turing. On
the other hand, the courts have come far enough that they certainly have the
power to hold powerful figures to account when they want to, as just
this year when the Supreme Court overturned Boris Johnson’s prorogation of
parliament. On the last public opinion divided down the political lines of the
Brexit confrontation, with some in Johnson’s government claiming angrily that
the court had overstepped its remit and making sinister mutters about reforming
it. In the present English crisis, we see well how the place of the courts is
yet one more form of power under contestation.
The
justice of Baroness Hale, who sank Boris’s prorogation, is clearly a very
different thing from the justice of Lord Jeffreys of Bloody Assizes fame. Power is not static. It changes – like the river, it
ebbs, flows, and swirls. And next door to the court, a familiar pattern of
shifting power-tides returns in the form of Hay’s Galleria. It used to
be Hay’s Wharf, which in the heyday of imperial plunder became one of London’s
principal landing sites for imported tea along with the other dry foodstuffs
that got it nicknamed ‘London’s Larder’. But since closing in 1970 it has been
redone into offices, shops and flats.
The
rentier class sweeps everything away, and like the Tower of London, once-mighty
powers tremble in the shadows of its upstarts. In the centre of Southwark is
evidence of another old power gone by.
This ruin is all that remains of Winchester Palace, once the London residence of the Bishops of Winchester and one of the grandest centres of authority in the London area. |
The Christian
church once wielded very real clout in this land. In medieval times the Bishop
of Winchester was effectively the king’s chancellor, giving the twelfth-century
Winchester Palace high status indeed. Southwark Cathedral
was preceded by a prestigious monastery, perhaps like many in this country a
centre not only of worship but of scholarship and fabulous wealth.
In
the period these were built the Church was already established as a
locus of spiritual authority in England, but in practice this meant regular
involvement in its political and economic affairs too. This meant trouble,
because the Church meant the Roman Catholic church, meaning in turn that an
external power – the Pope in Rome and his bishops – wielded authority in the
same territory as the English king. When they didn't get on, the crown-versus-church power struggle became one
of the most defining dynamics in early English politics, with the drama of King Henry
II and Archbishop Thomas Becket perhaps its most representative episode.
This
contest came to a spectacular and violent end in the 1530s under the Tudor
dynasty, when Henry VIII crushed the monasteries, seized control of the Church
in England for himself, and permanently threw the authority of the Pope out of
England. But because he did it out of his own personal interest in securing his dynastic succession, fucking Anne
Boleyn, and seizing the monasteries’ riches rather than for any higher constitutional
vision, his death saddled England with a further century and a half of
immiserating struggles, atrocious persecutions, and finally a messy civil war
before the religious strife he unleashed resolved into anything resembling a
peaceful settlement. Southwark Priory experienced this for itself, expropriated
by Henry VIII then used for trials under his daughter, Queen Mary, in which
religious dissidents were condemned to be burned alive. The Priory eventually
became the Protestant cathedral it is now and has been rebuilt often over the
years.
The
monarch, currently Elizabeth II, remains head of England’s Protestant state
church to this day. Though its power over people’s lives diminished
from those turbulent centuries on, that has not stopped religious power asserting itself through
other means. The centuries of seething anti-Catholic prejudice that followed,
in continuity with longer-term anti-Semitism and modern Islamophobia; the
dissenters and refugees unsatisfied with the eventual shape of Protestant
England who quit England for Northern Ireland or America, and from there went
on to cause all kinds of monumental trouble for their land of origin; such things have
mattered a great deal in shaping this country’s fate, and even now one ignores them
to one’s peril. Spiritual power can reach and move people from directions that
more material forms of power have no access to, especially in an age when the
latter is doing so much to discredit itself. It must be accounted for and
channelled in healthy directions if democracy is what this nation seeks.
Look
behind Southwark Cathedral and it appears these people have form in ironic ship
placements. As the HMS Belfast blasts loyalty to nation in the faces of City
bankers’ loyalty to their own pockets, another vessel challenges Southwark’s
installations of spirit with an installation of matter.
Replica of the Golden Hind, galleon of Sir Francis Drake. |
Other
people’s matter, for the most part.
Francis
Drake was a privateer, that is to say a pirate and private soldier, and one of
the most illustrious in the period those became popular under Henry VIII’s daughter
Elizabeth I. The government made use of these people to attack Spanish ships
and rob them of the treasures they themselves had plundered off the indigenous
South and Central Americans (whose civilisations the Spanish had spent that
century butchering) because relying on privateers rather than official forces
made it easier for the government to disavow responsibility. Aboard the Golden
Hind, Drake circumnavigated the world in a career which developed English
fortunes, knowledge and global connections that proved crucial for the colonial
empire they would go on to assemble. And indeed, it was out of precisely such
piracy that grew the City’s corporate big beasts who would do the assembling, like the Atlantic slave traders and the East India Company.
Southwark Bridge. Built in 1921, this is a fairly recent addition to the lower Thames bridges. |
Much as has been the case all the way up from Erith, the riverbank displays remnants of stories long gone by. |
Bankside
Such
was the power of the Bishops of Winchester that they set about some land
reclamation next door to their Southwark lair. The strip they took off the
river is now known as Bankside, but they might not have been impressed
by its later fate. It became a land of recreation, and not all of it salubrious:
bear-baiting, playhouses, and most famously the theatre, just as it was raised
to its revolutionary flourish by William Shakespeare.
Arts, games and sports are political. The political authorities dreaded them as
potential incubators of subversion, as did the religious authorities who found them
morally corrupting. But ironically they came here in the first place thanks in
part to the Bishops of Winchester, who by securing this area outside the
jurisdiction of the City made it the perfect place to do things you couldn’t in
places that pretended to respectability.
Shakespeare’s Globe. |
Shakespeare’s
Globe Theatre, resurrected in 1997, holds pride of place here. Beyond
its function it is a monument to one of the titans of the dramatic arts, and the
one person who has probably had the greatest individual impact on the English
language.
Shakespeare
and his work were critically immersed in the political atmosphere of his time.
His plays rampage around the English historical consciousness when not
single-handedly creating it, openly dissecting sensitive religious and
sexual topics while carry razor-sharp yet profound and sometimes ambiguously complex
political messages. Their resonances in the ominous years of the Tudor-Stuart
transition remain no less potent today, and so rich is the mountain of timeless
archetypes crystallised and deconstructed in his work that a surprising amount
of mystery still surrounds the person behind it.
Here
we see a completely different kind of power: not the coercive hard power
of political armies and pirates (be they privateers or financiers), but an
attractive soft power, first articulated by political scientist Joseph Nye, that moves hearts and minds through persuasion,
emotive impact and charismatic appeal. Soft does not necessary mean good,
still less democratic – it includes advertising and what is now called fake news – but
its heartier forms have been formidably important to England’s power in the
world, with the likes of Shakespeare, the Beatles, Manchester United and the
BBC World Service doing far more in this country’s favour than was ever
accomplished by its gunboats and bombers.
English
hard power has largely collapsed with its empire and industrial base, driving
their present crisis in the longer term. If they emerge from it, it could be
expected that any attempt to rebuild their international profile will instead
have to leverage their soft power assets like these to become loved in
the world, rather than feared or (as seems largely the present case) pitied.
Lessons from countries like Japan and Costa Rica, though by no means flawless, could
be worth heeding in that circumstance.
The area’s soft power concentration has assimilated another industrial relic. What used to be Bankside Power Station has bequeathed its unmistakable shape to the Tate Modern art museum. |
On
the north bank the City comes to an end at Blackfriars, so named for the
French Dominican priory that stood there till it was eaten by Henry VIII. But
the real boundary has been buried, quite literally. It is the lower course of
the River Fleet, one of the largest Thames tributaries until its
amassment of some of London’s worst slums, markets and prisons turned it into
an abominable open sewer. It has since been completely built over, but still
flows underground and discharges into the Thames beneath Blackfriars Bridge.
Lambeth
From
here the Thames crosses a weird middle distance between the Cities of London
and Westminster. Neither of one centre nor the other, it has seen the comings
and goings of yet more alternative forces in the English power story.
The
north side gained early significance when, after the Romans left and the City declined for a time, the Anglo-Saxon immigrants built a wīc
or trading port there called Lundenwic. After Alfred revived the old
City this port became simply the ‘old wīc’, whose name lives on in the crescent
of Aldwych. Nowadays it is dominated by the Temple district: the former
lair of Catholic military orders whose esoteric ambience was inherited by their
successors on that site, the lawyers.
On
the south side, whose concerns come and go in the gravitational pull of
Waterloo station, the river enters the former marshes of Lambeth,
whose name – ‘landing place for lambs’ – hints at its settlement’s riverine
origin.
Concealed by the trees is the Temple complex, built for the fearsome Knights Templar and later passed to the Order of St. John (Knights Hospitaller). When they fell victim to Henry VIII’s purge, some lawyers to whom they had leased bits of it took over the rest of the site and have stayed there ever since. Its two parts, the Inner Temple and Middle Temple, are now two of London’s four barristers’ professional associations (the Inns of Court), and still count as liberties, i.e. independent local authorities. Being lawyers, they have put to effective use the cryptic atmosphere they inherited from the knights. Maybe they are sitting on their massive secret treasure hoards too. |
The
recreational air of Bankside continues some way down the south bank, albeit
with an increasing sense of performative modernity.
Against these promises of tomorrow, the lamp-posts here are peculiar. Bearded Father Thames and gaping fish motifs suggest deep animistic or eldritch whispers. |
As
Lambeth draws level with the City of Westminster, that performative modernity
reaches a crescendo and surges with the explosive consumerism of the modern
tourism industry.
After WWII, the Labour Party government of Clement Attlee aspired to rebuild a ruined and bombed-out Britain. Famed for its creation of a new and visionary welfare state, within a few years that government was losing public support so decided to throw the 1951 Festival of Britain as a soft-power celebration of the nation’s recovery: a showcase of art, music, film and design right here on the south bank. A demonstration of English confidence, or a white elephant parade set loose by a government in trouble to disguise deeper problems? The question joins the Festival to a tradition that includes the Great Exhibition of 1851 before it and the Millennium Dome after it. The site where it happened is now these Jubilee Gardens. |
Westminster Bridge, with the Palace of Westminster behind it. |
Westminster
Bridge connects this jumble of disguised power scuffles with the place
where everyone expects to find them: the City of Westminster, ground zero of
England’s and Britain’s central political institutions. Westminster has been
the seat of government in England since one of the last Anglo-Saxon kings,
Edward the Confessor, commissioned the first Westminster Abbey (the ‘west
minster’) here in the 1040s on what was then Thorney Island – note the river’s
say again – and parked his palace next to it, and to this day most of this
nation’s core political institutions are based in that area. The bridge itself
is noteworthy as the first new bridge over the metropolitan Thames since Roman
times: it was opened in 1750 only after overcoming nearly a hundred years of
ferocious opposition and sabotage attempts by the City of London’s
monopoly-jealous merchants and ferrymen. Indeed it was this that led the City
to finally demolish the houses on London Bridge as they hurriedly sought to
improve it to compete in a new era of bridge-building.
For
three kilometres of river, that’s already a great deal of English power
problems. But if you hoped that we were nearly finished, I’m afraid you’d
better look over there.
It’s
the English Parliament.
Sorry
about that.
The City of Westminster
If
there is one image that stands for democracy in the worldwide imagination
today, it is surely this very Palace of Westminster. It houses the
English (currently British) Parliament, the principal body in a government
system seen as the archetype of parliamentary democracy – so much so that many
countries around the world have sought to emulate this Westminster Model
in their own democratic efforts.
Even
its building seems to advertise this constitutional romance. It dates to the
mid-nineteenth century, far more recent than parliament itself, when it
replaced a previous palace which burned down. Its battery of Gothic Revival
spires soars into the air, as though in symbolism of a power which grows organically
from the people on the ground and carries their will to the supreme heights.
There
are many reasons England is not in fact a democracy. Considering the
frustration of democratic outcomes by unaccountable powers such as the river
has shown us so far, this cannot be called a country where power is arranged
and put to use for the well-being of its people. But even leaving that wider
problem aside for a moment to focus on Parliament itself, the historical fact, and
there is really no way around it, is that as far as democracy is concerned,
this institution is not a veteran, but a newcomer.
Parliament
originated not as a popular body but a bunch of landowners, barons and priests,
all men, gathered around England’s kings after the Norman Conquest of 1066.
These ‘Great Councils’ helped the monarch keep on good terms with the powerful interests
at the top of English society, its nobility and clergy, without whose support,
not to mention money, ruling was very difficult; this is to some extent the
case in all societies, no matter how autocratic. The big flashpoint here, celebrated
by the English with almost mythological enthusiasm, was when angry barons
rounded on King John and forced him to sign away some of his power in the Magna
Carta of 1215. This of course had nothing to do with democracy and
everything to do with protecting the power of the barons and priests at the top
of the feudal hierarchy.
Over
the centuries these councils gained permanence. Soon they were being called a parliament,
a Norman French coinage (parlement, a ‘speaking’ or ‘conference’). They
grew in strength when the monarch was weak and bubbled under when the monarch
was strong. The Tudors were strong, but when Henry VIII smashed the priesthood
off Parliament’s benches, that magnified the presence of its other main component,
the landlords. By then they were already Enclosing common land in their
territories for profit, and in the turbulence of the English Reformation many
turned to extreme Protestantism and became Puritans, making them ever richer
and tougher-minded just as the wars of Elizabeth I and extravagance of her
successor, the Stuart king James I, emptied out the monarchy’s pockets and made
it reliant on them for cash. Gradually, inadvertently, a new power imbalance
was emerging between the monarch and parliament, whose explosion in the
seventeenth century would knock that constitutional relationship onto its head.
And
knock heads off it. When in the 1640s Parliament’s growing assertiveness came
into conflict with King Charles I, James’s son, who insisted that the king was
vested with supreme authority by God, the country plunged into the Civil Wars. The
immense complexity of these conflicts is condensed in popular imagination to
one of the most remarkable set-piece images in English history: when
Parliament, having defeated the king in a full-scale military campaign up and down the
country, put him on trial, found him guilty, and beheaded him.
The
English had known regicide before, but Parliament’s behaviour this time was
different. Having asserted its physical power, it now asserted power over the
English story. It claimed the institution of Parliament had origins deep in Anglo-Saxon
heritage, long before the monarchy, which by this reading was duty-bound to
respect and listen to it; hence Charles Stuart’s naughtiness in failing to do
so, and Parliament’s right to exercise its greater authority in holding him to
account. This was neither the first nor last time in this world that revolutionaries
have disguised themselves as traditionalists, but what was basically a
re-writing of history has had remarkable staying power. It is from here that
has grown the present-day myth that parliamentary democracy has timeless roots
in some deep English ethno-national essence.
But
democracy was far away. Parliament was still a gang of rich landowners out to
protect their class interests, and they actively suppressed movements to get
ordinary people’s concerns represented in politics. They ruled as a military
junta no less authoritarian than the king had been, and after the death of
their figurehead, Oliver Cromwell, the country was fed up enough to bring the
late king’s son back from exile to restore the monarchy again. Nor did it help Parliament’s
legitimacy that the Stuarts had a tendency for professional martyrdom, and Charles
had been no exception in swathing his death with an aura
of tragic romance and wronged integrity. Parliament’s power was only
cemented for good in 1689 after another revolution and a Dutch invasion: the
MPs did a deal to accept the Dutch Stadtholder, William of Orange, as king in
return for a Bill of Rights that enshrined in law Parliament’s right to
powers over his office, along with freedom of speech on the benches (now known as parliamentary privilege, which lets them say illegal things if deemed necessary for their duties) and regular elections.
Elections,
that is, among the tiny part of the population who were male, adult, and drew
rents from an extremely high threshold of land ownership. It was on these
hyper-exclusive terms that Parliament developed into a form recognisable today,
as political parties and prime ministers emerged to represent, and finally replace,
the executive power of the king or queen. Nothing resembling democracy entered
into it, and wouldn’t for some two centuries more until mass popular struggles
like the Chartists and women’s suffrage movements prised open the franchise in
bits and pieces – to people without massive property, to younger people, to women – and hacked away at corrupt
practices like the rotten boroughs (like MPs getting in for a
constituency that had fallen into the sea or only had seven people living in it).
Naturally, Parliament’s abiding vested interests, now increasingly bound to the
mighty corporations of the industrial revolution, kicked and screamed in
contemptuous resistance all the way.
The
last major voting reforms were in 1928, after which all men and women aged 28
or over could vote, and in 1969, when this was extended to people aged 18-20.
It has therefore been less than one hundred years since any talk of electoral
democracy became meaningful in this country, and the franchise still has
glaring flaws: lowering the voting age (i.e. to people whose futures are most screwed over by political failings) is a recurring debate, and prisoners are
still excluded. But the real problem is deeper, has been brought into bilious
relief by the Brexit crisis, and at its heart goes right back to this
seventeenth-century revolution that Parliament brought about.
It
is that the English are insecure in what democracy means. Far from consensually
arriving at a stable model and offering it for the world to emulate, their
constitutional settlement actually emerged from a long bout of authoritarian
bloodletting, in which both factions insisted their political values
represented the true national interest but in practice each sought power over
the other. Although executive power then passed from the monarch to a Prime
Minister and Cabinet, its power relationship with Parliament has never been
truly resolved. Any accountability either of them have to the wider public has
been won piecemeal through generations of blood and tears, and is not in any
way enshrined in the culture or identity of those institutions which for most
of their lives preferred to answer to no-one but themselves.
It
is hardly coincidence, then, that such a central plot of the Brexit drama has
been abitter conflict between government and parliament, with each
side’s supporters, and those of Leave and Remain more broadly, shouting in passion that they have exclusive claim to what democracy means while
tarring their opponents as betrayers of the nation’s democratic will. In terms
of historical fact, neither is right. On the one hand, this country has no
solid tradition of making decisions by direct referendum, and its authoritarian
cultural history makes it easy to parse how so many of its people could recklessly define
democracy as a coercive act of violence by a majority over a minority, i.e. Brexit. But nor
does the more meaningful sense of democracy – the social and economic effort to
build a freer and more inclusive togetherness, so at risk of being blown to
pieces by Brexit – have historical basis here either, given the sheer
number of people, past and present, abandoned and left without stake in those efforts.
But of course, this was never about who is factually right or wrong, no more than the arugments between the Royalist Cavaliers and the Parliamentary Roundheads were. The
problem is a normative one, about what kind of England its people want: and
after so many years of failing to live up to their own democratic rhetoric, it
has all come down, yet again, to a painful and disorienting power struggle.
Vauxhall
With
that, thankfully, it is time to get clear of English capital territory. The river
now begins a long escape via the old marshlands and villages on Westminster’s
western flank, historically part of Surrey (south) and Middlesex (north). Much
of this land fell under the manorial estates of the Norman kings’ orbiting nobility
– Vauxhall, ‘Falkes’s Hall’, is named for one of them – and, further
west, of the royals themselves. The villages in these marshes sprouted mills and
factories in industrial times to make use of the river and its tributaries, as
well as the odd political or cultural installation.
There is also the headquarters of a UN agency here, the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Like many countries, England has never been at ease with international power structures unless it gets to be in charge of them. Since winning WWII it has had a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, though for how much longer is surely in doubt. But it has reacted with raging hysteria to routine UN investigations that constructively criticised it on violence against women (2014) and extreme poverty (2019), and in the last month has refused to comply with a ruling by the UN General Assembly to relinquish its illegal occupation of the Chagos Islands. |
The London Fire Brigade headquarters from 1937 to 2007. It has since moved to Southwark. |
Much
of the de-industrialised land here is now – of course – being re-done into
unaffordable luxury housing.
Like these. Does anyone actually live here? |
Near
Vauxhall Bridge, two more ancient powers flow dormant beneath the
surface. From the south the river Effra descended to the Thames till it
was largely absorbed into Bazalgette’s
sewer system. To the north, the Tyburn comes down from the Hampstead
hills and still discharges into the Thames here. Both are now completely
underground but might return in a future where London recedes.
More redevelopments for the modern-day barons and clergy of rentier capitalism: the St George Wharf complex with its recognisable hats, completed in 2007-12. |
Wandsworth
Hereabouts
the marshes gave way to Surrey farmland, where an island or dry ground (Old
English ēg)
got named for someone called Beadurīc, whence this district’s present name
Battersea. This was in turn part of the big Norman manor which encompassed a settlement (worth) named after a Wændel, whence the Borough of Wandsworth.
Unusually the Thames’s major tributary through here, the Wandle, got its
name from the settlement and not the other way round.
All
this moving water attracted the mills and workshops of industrialisation,
catalysed in this case by a pivotal factor: immigration. As the Reformation ripped
Europe apart in religious warfare in the sixteenth century, a large number of
persecuted French Protestants, called Huguenots, fled to England,
whereupon the word refugee first entered the English language to
describe them. Many of them settled in Wandsworth, and because they had skilled
traditions in weaving, dyeing, hat-making and the chemicals and metallurgy to
support those sectors, they helped turn Wandsworth into an industrial
powerhouse in a period when textiles were at the core of the national economy.
The teardrops depicted on the present Borough
of Wandsworth’s coat of arms still commemorates these people who taught
England one of its first lessons in how helping refugees reaps its own rewards.
Here
on the riverfront the Nine Elms zone, formerly taken over by railways
and gasworks, is undergoing regeneration into apartments and shopping centres.
Battersea
is where the regeneration brigade have scrambled for a specially succulent
jackpot. The four-chimneyed profile of Battersea Power Station,
completed only after WWII, has held a commanding profile on the Chelsea Reach
even long after its abandonment and fall to dereliction. Schemes to convert it
into something else – shops, apartments, even a theme park – have been put
forward by one development company after another, only for each to fall apart
because the money ran out, the works went wrong, or people got angry about it. It
is as though the building itself is determined to see off visions it deems
unworthy, and although someone appears to have finally got a tight enough hold to
really go for it with their cranes and scaffolding, time will tell if they,
too, are shrugged off onto its pile of vanquished suitors.
Battersea Power Station. Let’s see how long this behemoth allows this latest Lilliputian army to clamber around on it. |
Now here is perhaps as healthy a deployment of power as we are likely to see on this journey. One of Battersea’s most eminent names today is the Battersea Dogs and Cats Home, a venerable animal shelter providing love, safety and re-housing for vulnerable animals since 1860. They have an explicit policy commitment to never turn away a dog or cat in need. |
Some
of the marshes refused to be built on. Dark and windswept in the dingy shadows
of industrial workshops, the stretch beyond the power station known as Battersea
Fields was a convenient place for duellists to come and blow each other’s
brains out until it got swept up in the
let’s-preserve-green-spaces-while-we-still-can movement and was prettified into
Battersea Park in the 1850s. This first large riverside park encountered
on this route has been a precious local space for walking, sports, funfairs,
and general recovery from London ever since.
Over the bridge is Chelsea’s Royal Hospital, a famed retirement home for former soldiers who they put in red coats and tricorne hats and call Chelsea Pensioners. |
Down
the rest of the Battersea Reach, the old concentration of riverside industries has
given way to a protracted unaffordable-housing orgy.
Ransome’s Dock, which once served the local industries but now finds itself hemmed in by new apartments. |
At
last, this long strike through the English heart approaches its end along the
Wandsworth riverfront.
Battersea Railway Bridge, a creature of the railway companies since they built it in 1863. It feeds trains into the nightmare tangle of Clapham Junction to the south. |
The
goal of this section, Putney, lies just ahead.
Despite Brexit, the moorings at Prospect Quay, which once served a large coal or gas depot, resemble the gondola posts of Venice. |
Putney’s The Boathouse pub is built into a former vinegar brewery. |
Putney
Putney
is different: a very old village with a name origin lost in obscurity, whose
bridge signals our escape at last from the London core. The relative narrowness
of the riverbend here made it a ferry crossing of old, but its first bridge
dates well beyond the capital’s bridge scramble to the opening phase of the war
between Parliament and the king. The parliamentary army threw down boats to
make a pontoon bridge here as they rushed across soldiers and artillery to
secure Surrey against the king’s incoming army in 1642; his failure to get London
back off them and retreat up the Thames valley guaranteed the war’s spread
across the rest of the country.
As
something of a waypoint for river travel to the royal playgrounds upstream, Putney
seems to have been well-supplied and looked after even while maintaining its
character of a semi-rural hamlet. It has
long exerted a subtle significance in the national story, with all manner of
prominent personages coming through it like Henry VIII’s enforcer Thomas
Cromwell (also decapitated at the Tower) and the great historian Edward Gibbon,
both of whom were born here.
But
it is another civil war story in Putney that offers a fitting close for today’s
exploration of English power, and of the many ways it has acted to frustrate,
subvert, or downright strangle this people’s attempts to create a democratic
reality. No episode better exemplifies this tradition than the Putney Debates,
which took place here, at this Church of St. Mary the Virgin, in 1647.
By then
the war had raged for five years. Parliament and its New Model Army had
captured King Charles, who was amusing himself by pretending to negotiate with
them while actually waiting for them to fall out among themselves. And he had
good reason to hope this would happen.
It
is hard to imagine how bewildering a period this must have been for everyone
involved. The English had bloodied their kings before but had never seen the
institution of the monarchy itself challenged like this, let alone done away
with altogether as it would be for a decade to come. One product of that
atmosphere was a flourishing of radical social and political movements. The
most prominent was the Levellers, named for people who had flattened
hedges by which private landlords Enclosed common ground, and they called for religious
freedom, natural rights, gender equality, progressive taxation, social justice,
and the right to vote regardless of whether or not you held property. A rainbow
of further groups with fantastic names and grassroots profiles of their own –
Diggers, Ranters, Quakers, Fifth Monarchists and so forth – completed a kaleidoscope
which shook out what appears to have been the first authentic, peaceful, and sustained articulation of democratic politics in English history.
Now the
Parliamentarians might have toppled the king but they were still an authoritarian military
regime led by rich landowners. They framed their revolutionary war against King
Charles as a conservative mission to uphold England’s true constitutional order,
intending originally only to bring him to account and only later, under
pressure of circumstances, deciding to lop off his head and abolish his office
altogether. They found these movements’ calls for democratic reforms alarming
in the extreme. But simply ignoring them was not an option because they had
taken root, perhaps ironically, in their New Model Army itself, which – another
first for England – was a professionalised force built from the populace based
on merit, not appointed by social rank. By now it was full of soldiers who had
done all the hard work of defeating the Royalist army and were now sitting
around, waiting to be paid, and wanting a chance to participate in governing the
new country they had helped create.
It
was these Levellers who, in presenting their manifesto, spooked Oliver Cromwell
and Parliament’s other leaders, lest they lose authority in their army, into
holding the Putney Debates to resolve the matter. And in that meeting Thomas
Rainsborough, one of the Levellers’ most articulate spokespeople, stood up and delivered
these immortal lines:
I
think that the poorest he that is in England has a life to live as the greatest
he; and therefore, truly, sir, I think it’s clear that every man that is to
live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself
under that government; and I do think that the poorest man in England is not at
all bound in a strict sense to that government that he has not had a voice to
put himself under.
Emphasis
added, because look at that. Consent. The core principle of democratic
power relationships, whether with the state or between individuals, and
goodness knows they have yet to crack it in either more than 350 years
later.
Parliament’s
response? It hedged for a while, sowed division among the ranks, then visited
merciless violence on anyone who still dared to speak out. When after a few
years the movements still weren’t going away, an exasperated Cromwell expressed
the traditional English attitude to democracy best:
You
are necessitated to break them.
And
so the first known gasp of democracy in England was throttled, not to resurface
in serious contention for another two hundred years – and then of course, from
Peterloo to the labour movement, from the Chartists to the Suffragettes, the
instinctive response from the authorities was always the bullets, blades,
handcuffs and swaggering contempt of authoritarianism, which struggled against
each wave as long as it could, before giving up as little ground as it could
get away with, once it had no choice.
What
impression are we to be left with then, after following the Thames through the
political heart of England, if not that beneath the veneer of the popular story
of apparent democracy flows a far darker tale? A tale driven less by the will
of the people, by any estimation, and more by the violence and myth-making of
those who, whenever they seized power in this land, were unrelenting in their
determination to keep it? And where does it leave them today, lost in yet
another raw power struggle disguised by lashings of competitive storytelling
about English democracy, whose only common feature is that none has been able
to provide a story acceptable to most people?
There
will be people, especially those who believe in history as a straight line of
progress culminating in a wonderful thing called modernity, who claim
this is an unreasonable standard to hold them to; that real democracy, let
alone things like social justice and gender equality, are anachronistic to
speak of in a history shaped by a naturally violent and hierarchical human nature.
That’s why events like the Putney Debates matter: they are proof that this
excuse is hollow and this concept of nature a nonsense. The will for democracy has
existed, and people are on record as having voiced it.
England
chose not to listen – chose violence instead.
They
must take responsibility for their nation’s authoritarian mistakes.
They
should be warned that this authoritarian instinct has never really left them.
And
they should look to the river. Here, past where democracy had its first real go
in this land, the river ebbs and flows, up and down, twice a day. This water is
the real power here, ancient when this nation was young, with each of England's phasing power arrangements it has shown us today mere ripples in its journey of
millennia. It moves much like history does: not from a pre-determined beginning
to end but with every motion unique, a story in itself, if with a few recurring
patterns and habits. It brings in all the ideas and resources its human guests
need to assemble whatever power arrangement they want – but that choice, it
leaves to them.
No comments:
Post a Comment